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The purpose of this paper is to review the literature dealing with horizontal and 
vertical tax competition in the transport sector, taking into account the role of 
transport externalities. Our emphasis throughout is on tax competition between 
governments, not between private suppliers. For the various different settings 
(horizontal and vertical competition, parallel and serial networks), we discuss the 
relevance of tax competition and describe the type of results typically obtained. We 
further point out the relevance of different types of tax competition for transport 
policy in a European setting. Finally, we discuss the losses of non-cooperative 
behaviour of governments.  
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  The purpose of this paper is to review the fairly limited literature on tax 
competition in the transport sector, and to discuss its relevance for policy making in a 
European setting. To be more precise, we focus on two types of tax competition, 
resulting from different relationships between governments. First, vertical tax 
relations between governments exist when one government (e.g., the “federal” level) 
rules over a territory that consists of several states or regions that each have their own 
government. The interactions between these different levels of government imply the 
potential for vertical tax competition. Second, horizontal tax competition results when 
governments at the same level compete; consider, for example, competition between 
regions or states in a federal country, or competition between countries within the EU. 
  Note that our survey is restricted on at least three accounts. One is that we 
limit the discussion to competition between two types of government. Obviously, in 
principle different types of agents can compete for tax or toll revenues: governments, 
public companies (e.g., railways) or private companies (e.g., private bus companies, 
private road authorities). This paper restricts the analysis to the competition between 
governments for two reasons. First, the competition between private suppliers has 
already been analyzed and surveyed in more detail in the literature (see, e.g., de 
Palma, A. and R. Lindsey (2000)). Second, although private companies sometimes 
operate the transport services or the required infrastructures, governments ultimately 
regulate and control the pricing and tax policies that are used. 
  A second restriction is that we mainly focus on competition in terms of taxes 
and pricing instruments. Of course, other instruments in the competition for transport 
tax or toll revenues could be studied as well. Investment in capacity and in quality 
(road surface, ancillary services) can indeed also be used to attract traffic: this results 
in ‘expenditure competition’. In this paper, however, we mainly emphasize the use of 
pricing instruments: taxes, tolls, fares, user charges, etc. We are interested in the 
effect of tax competition on the level of the pricing instruments, on total transport 
flows, and on the revenues ultimately received by the different governments.  
  The behaviour of governments is not easy to characterize: it is the result of a 
complicated game between voters, politicians, bureaucrats and policy makers. A third 
restriction of our survey is that, in most of the literature reviewed in this paper, it is 
assumed that the government maximizes some weighted sum of the welfare of its   2 
voters: the authorities are assumed to be interested in the consumer surplus of the 
local transport users and in all transport tax revenues it collects. This assumption is in 
line with the mainstream political economy literature (see Dixit et al., 1997) and 
allows us to make welfare judgments on the outcome of policies. 
  Structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we first provide a quick 
overview of the various types of tax and expenditure externalities related to the 
transport sector.  Section 3 then focuses on horizontal tax competition in 
transportation. Since issues of horizontal tax competition have a long tradition in 
public economics, it will be instructive to first briefly review what the public finance 
literature has to say on this type of tax competition, and then to focus in detail on 
applications in transportation. The emphasis will be consecutively on parallel and 
serial tax competition. The scarce literature on vertical transport tax competition is 
treated in Section 4. Finally, a concluding section points at a number of important 




2. Fiscal externalities in transportation: a quick overview 
 
  Transport pricing with multiple governments and externalities is complicated 
because many vertical and horizontal fiscal externalities occur simultaneously with 
spill-overs of congestion and environmental externalities. That foreign traffic creates 
congestion externalities, noise, accidents and air pollution on the home territory is 
well known (see De Borger and Proost (2001)). What is less well known is that the 
tax and expenditure instruments that countries use to correct these externalities by 
themselves create a series of problems. Indeed, they lead to fiscal externalities 
whenever the pricing or expenditure policy of one government affects the objective 
function of other governments without proper compensation.  
  Table 1 makes abstraction of pollution and congestion and lists some of the 
fiscal and expenditure externalities in transportation. Both horizontal and vertical tax 
and expenditure externalities are considered. Moreover, the table further distinguishes 
direct versus indirect externalities. Direct fiscal externalities directly affect prices or 
local public good provisions for non-residents, whereas indirect externalities in 
addition affect tax revenues of other governments.    3 
  As previously argued, in this paper we will mainly focus on tax externalities. 
Note that the relative importance of tax competition and tax exporting itself will 
strongly depend on the mobility of the tax base, and therefore on the specific tax 
instruments used. For example, if fuel taxes are used as one of the main instruments, 
tax competition may largely dominate tax exporting (especially in small open 
economies), whereas the latter may become much more relevant if road tolls are used 
in large countries. 
 
 
Table 1: fiscal and expenditure competition in transportation  
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3. Horizontal tax competition 
 
 
  Issues of horizontal tax competition have a long tradition in public economics. 
It will therefore be instructive to first briefly review what the public finance literature 
has to say on this type of tax competition, and then to move on to applications in the 
transport sector that take account of its specific characteristics (e.g., the presence of 
pure transit, different modes, etc.). 
 
3.1. Some lessons from the public finance literature   
 
  There is a huge literature in public economics on the efficiency implications of 
tax exporting and tax competition, and on the resulting tax rates and levels of public 
service supply. First, it has been shown that tax exporting (a direct tax externality) 
leads jurisdictions to either tax discriminate against non-residents or to excessively 
tax goods that are to a large extent consumed by non-residents (see, e.g., Arnott and 
Grieson (1981) or Dahlby (1996)). Second, tax competition (an indirect horizontal 
fiscal externality) occurs whenever an increase in a jurisdiction’s tax rate affects tax 
revenues in other jurisdictions. Jurisdictions then tend to compete for the mobile tax 
base. If capital is the mobile factor, many papers (e.g., Bucovetsky and Wilson 
(1991), Wildasin (1988); see the survey in Wilson (1999)) suggest that tax 
competition puts downward pressure on tax rates and yields too low a level of public 
good supply. Intuitively, when a country raises its tax rate it treats capital outflow as a 
cost, and it ignores the benefits to other regions.  
  Models of commodity taxation in an international setting confirm the 
inefficiency of tax competition. Within a general equilibrium framework, Mintz and 
Tulkens (1986) showed that tax rates are generally too low; this results in under 
provision of public services. More recently, Kanbur and Keen (1993) studied a partial 
equilibrium model of cross-border shopping with asymmetric regions in which the 
objective of regions is the maximisation of tax revenues. They showed that, at the 
Nash equilibrium, the small country undercuts the large country, and that the former 
may substantially benefit from tax competition. This is simply because of the high 
elasticity of tax revenues with respect to the tax rate: a low tax rate generates 
substantial extra revenues (see, e.g., fuel tax policy in Luxemburg). Different policy   5 
instruments to improve overall welfare are considered, including harmonized tax rates 
and the imposition of minimum tax rates. It is shown that small countries would lose 
by harmonisation of taxes at levels between the pre-reform taxes in the two countries. 
Harmonisation helps the large country if the harmonised rate is sufficiently high. A 
minimum tax rate between the two Nash equilibrium rates is shown to improve 
welfare, although this last result does not hold in more general models (Haufler 
(1996)). 
  A few recent models have considered multiple tax bases (see, e.g., Janeba and 
Peters (1999)) under various mobility assumptions
1. They focus on the question 
whether preferential treatment (same tax rate on two bases) induces more or less tax 
competition. Finally, tax and expenditure competition have been compared in studies 
by, e.g., Wildasin (1989) and Upman (1998). It is found that, if public services benefit 
residents, the Nash equilibria in taxes and expenditures differ; moreover, expenditure 
competition turns out to more competitive in the sense of leading to lower levels of 
public spending than tax competition. If public expenditures mainly benefit industries, 
this last result does not generally hold. 
  So far, the inefficiency of tax competition has been stressed. However, recent 
work examines the possibilities for welfare-improving tax competition. At least three 
arguments have been put forward. First, competition to attract firms (through 
subsidies) may be efficient (Black and Hoyt (1989)) if it induces efficient firm 
location. Second, imperfectly competitive markets may make tax competition 
efficient. The seminal Brander and Spencer argument is that there will be inefficient 
export subsidies to domestic industries in models with Cournot competition and 
exogenous location. However, if firms choose location then tax competition for firms 
eliminates these wasteful subsidies to exports (Janeba (1998)). Third, tax competition 
also solves the government’s commitment problems with respect to, e.g., capital 
investments. In the absence of tax competition, if governments determine taxes after 
investments have been made, there is an incentive to set taxes high. With tax 
competition, however, governments must keep taxes low (see, e.g., Kehoe (1989)). 
 
                                                 
1 So far, little literature seems to exist on the simultaneous competition in taxes and expenditures in 
cases where there are benefit spillovers from expenditures (e.g., investment in infrastructure), and 
where tax exporting opportunities are enhanced by local spending. This may be relevant for transport 
markets where governments may not only compete via fuel taxes and road tolls, but they may use 
specific infrastructural investments as an instrument for tax exporting.   6 
 
3.2.Horizontal tax competition in transport    
 
  The lessons from the general public finance literature are extremely useful, but 
they are not directly applicable to transportation because of the special characteristics 
of the transport sector. Countries’ transport networks are usually publicly provided, 
they are congestible, and they are accessible to local users and to transit transport
2. 
Moreover, two prototype situations should be distinguished, where especially the 
second one is specific to the transport sector. This is illustrated in Figure 1 
PARALLEL LINKS: transit traffic can pass via regions




SERIAL LINKS : transit traffic passes via regions A AND 
B that both tax traffic
Origin Destination
Country A Country B
 
Figure 1 The two types of horizontal tax competition 
  One situation arises when, as is often the case, transit traffic has a choice 
between different jurisdictions’ networks. For example, there are two main routes 
from South-Central Europe (Switzerland, Austria, and Italy) to the north (Belgium, 
Netherlands, etc.), one through France, the other via Germany. Or consider the 
transalpine crossing between Germany and Italy, where Austria and Switzerland 
compete for transit traffic. In both examples, transit has a choice of routes and it 
interacts with local traffic in each country. When transit has a choice of routes, where 
                                                 
2 To avoid confusion, note that we use the term ‘transit’ to refer to ‘through traffic’, i.e., traffic that has 
its both origin and destination outside the country under consideration.     7 
each route is priced by a different government, we talk about (horizontal) parallel tax 
competition. A second type of problem arises when transit has to use a route that 
sequentially runs through the territory of different governments; as a consequence, the 
same transit traffic can be taxed by each of the governments. Obvious examples are 
trucks running from Spain to the Netherlands; they can, among others, be tolled in 
France and in Belgium. Other examples of competition can occur at the level of 
transfer facilities that are owned by different governments. Obviously, these issues are 
extremely relevant in view of Trans European Networks (TEN’s) discussed within the 
EU. We denote these issues as (horizontal) serial tax competition. The main 
difference with parallel tax competition is that transit has no route choice anymore, 




3.2.1. Parallel tax competition  
  What can we learn from the scarce literature on parallel tax competition in 
transport? The public finance literature suggests that inefficiencies will result due to 
competition for revenues and tax exporting behaviour; these suggestions have to be 
revaluated in the presence of externalities and the specific context of transport 
markets. We first review some relevant findings from the literature and then illustrate 
some important implications on the basis of one specific simple model.  
  Although not specifically dealing with tax competition, it is useful to start our 
review by looking at some preliminary results. First, the problem of one government 
responsible for optimally taxing a parallel network has been explored in great detail in 
the literature. If road users are homogenous, the results show that there are important 
welfare losses when for some reason not all links can be optimally tolled (e.g., Braid 
(1996) and Liu and McDonald (1998)). However, more recent research by Small and 
Yan (2001) and Verhoef and Small (2004) shows that allowing for a heterogeneous 
population of road users substantially increases the benefits from second best tolls. 
Second, relevant information can also be obtained from the growing literature that 
explicitly studies the role of different ownership regimes in models with parallel 
routes. For example, Verhoef et al. (1996) consider competition between a private   8 
road and a free-access road, and compare the second-best optimal tolls with those 
obtained when both roads are privately owned.  De Palma and Lindsey (2000) use a 
bottleneck model of congestion and compare three types of ownership structure: a 
private road competing with a free access road, two competing private roads, and 
competition between a private and a public operator. 
  The above papers do not distinguish between transit and local traffic demand 
and, therefore, do not specifically deal with tax competition for transit by welfare 
maximising governments. In fact, only a few models explicitly look at horizontal tax 
competition between governments in two-region models with transport externalities. 
Bjorner (1996) looks at first-best outcomes in a simple two product-two country 
general equilibrium model, where production of one good uses freight transport (both 
on domestic and foreign territory) as an input apart from labour, and illustrates the 
potential for tax competition and tax exporting. More recently, De Borger, Courcelle 
and Swysen (2004) apply a large-scale numerical optimisation model to study tax 
policies by individual regions in a model with both domestic and international freight 
transport. The empirical analysis mainly illustrates tax exporting behaviour of 
individual countries: optimal tax rates rise when transit shares increase. The welfare 
losses from strategic pricing by individual regions are found to be relatively small. 
  To understand some important implications of tax competition between 
governments on parallel road networks, the most instructive way is probably to use a 
very simple intuitive model. In the remainder of this subsection, we therefore 
illustrate some useful results derived in De Borger, Proost and Van Dender (2004). 
The model has two parallel routes that are operated by two countries, for given levels 
of infrastructure supply.  Both local and transit traffic contribute to congestion, and 
the two countries compete for revenue from transit. Assuming that countries 
maximise a welfare function consisting of local consumer surplus and tax revenues 
from local and transit traffic, the paper studies strategic tolling by individual countries 
under various tolling schemes. Three types of tolling are studied, as described in 
Table 2. 
  Despite a number of obvious simplifications, each of the three tolling regimes 
has policy-relevant applications within the EU. Among others, the case of 
differentiated tolls is relevant because, when EU member states use different tolling 
instruments for local and transit transport, the implied tax levels will automatically   9 
differ. The case of uniform tolls provides an appropriate description when EU 
member countries use the same pricing instruments, because explicit toll 
discrimination between local and transit transport contradicts EU regulations. Finally, 
the case of ‘local tolls only’ is not unlike the current situation in many countries, 
where fuel taxes are the main tolling instrument that can easily be evaded by transit 
transport by fueling elsewhere.  
 
 




Toll discrimination   Home users are tolled differently than transit users  
Uniform toll   Home users and transit users pay the same toll  
Local traffic only   Only home users can be tolled  
 
 
  The major theoretical insights from the model can be summarised as follows. 
First, if countries can charge differentiated tolls to home users and transit users, they 
will typically set the transit toll strictly larger than the local toll. This simply reflects 
tax exporting behaviour (see, e.g., Arnott and Grieson (1981), Wilson (1999)). 
Importantly, however, it is shown that both the local toll and the toll on transit exceed 
the local marginal external cost. This is due to the interaction of local and transit 
demand in generating congestion. The local tax should reflect the true opportunity 
cost of an increase in local traffic; however, this not only covers the local direct 
marginal external cost, but also the opportunity cost of the lost tax revenues on transit. 
Indeed, more local traffic implies higher congestion and hence less transit demand. As 
a consequence, the toll on home users exceeds the marginal congestion cost. 
  Second, it is found that if countries are restricted to use uniform tolls, then the 
optimal uniform toll exceeds the local direct marginal external cost; moreover, it rises 
with transit. Again, except for the role of congestion, this is in line with the earlier tax 
competition literature. Intuitively, the toll balances the distortion on the local transport 
market and the revenue opportunities from transit. If transit captures a large share of 
all traffic in a country, this will be reflected in a higher uniform toll.   10 
  Third, if a government can only toll local users, then it is shown that it should 
optimally select tolls that are lower than the local direct marginal cost (the negative 
externality imposed upon the local users). To understand why this is the case, note 
that the toll reduces local transport demand. However, this in turn reduces the 
marginal private time cost for transit and attracts more transit, decreasing local 
welfare. The consequence is that it is best to charge a tax below the local marginal 
external cost. In fact, if transit traffic reacts very strongly to an average travel time 
cost decrease, it may be optimal to set the tax very low so as to avoid attracting too 
much transit.  
  In order to check whether these theoretical predictions are confirmed, and to 
find out how important the inefficiencies of parallel tax competition are, one 
procedure is to use numerical simulations. Table 3 summarizes the results of one 
particular simulation with two parallel and identical roads. The table compares a 
situation with zero tolls with various Nash equilibria and with a centrally optimal 
solution in which all fiscal externalities are internalized. Note that, in the absence of 
tolling, it was assumed that transit represented 50% of total transport flows. Looking 
at the results, note that in the Nash equilibrium with differentiated tolls, both the local 
and transit toll exceed the local marginal external cost, the local toll is equal to the 
global marginal external congestion cost, and the transit toll exceeds the local toll.  
This contrasts to the centralised solution, where both transit and local tolls equal the 
global marginal external cost. In the Nash equilibrium with uniform tolls, the optimal 
toll is between the toll levels of the differentiated case.  Interestingly, the optimal 
local toll is very low in the Nash equilibrium case where transit remains un-tolled: it 
amounts to 6.8 Euro relative to a global marginal external cost of 30.7 Euro. 
  Concerning the relative welfare levels at the different equilibria, three types of 
results follow from the final row in the table. First, it tells us that the Nash equilibrium 
with differentiated tolls is able to generate a large percentage (93%) of the maximal 
possible welfare gain at the centralised solution. This suggests that the welfare costs 
of the lack of coordination between countries are relatively modest
3. Importantly, it 
shows that tolling with no coordination is much better than no tolling at all. Second, 
when we compare the Nash equilibrium with and without toll differentiation, the 
                                                 
3 This result is in line with the few explicit numerical illustrations of the welfare effects of various 
types of tax competition. An early example is Wildasin (1989), who finds substantial welfare effects of 
property tax competition in the US.  More recently, Sorensen (2000) estimates the welfare gain of tax 
harmonisation within the EU at less than 1% of GDP.     11 
uniformity constraint implies a very small overall welfare loss, despite a substantial 
impact on the local toll. Local welfare goes down only marginally because the 
reduction in local consumer surplus is almost fully offset by the increase in tax 
revenues. The results indicate that the overall welfare effects of uniform versus 
differentiated tolls are quite similar, although the distribution between local and 
transit welfare, and the composition of local welfare are substantially different. Third, 
if transit cannot be tolled, we find the performance of both the Nash and the 
centralised outcome to be substantially worse than in the cases where transit is indeed 






Table 3 Illustration of parallel tax competition  


















Local toll (Euro/trip)  0  27.1  36.8  6.8  27.7  27.5 
Transit toll (Euro/trip)  0  37.9  36.8  0  27.7  0 
Local MEC (Euro/trip)  15.6  13.9  13.3  15.1  13.8  13.7 
Global MEC (Euro/trip)  31.1  27.1  26.5  30.7  27.7  29.4 
Share max. W gain (%)  0  93  89  22  100  49 




3.2.2. Serial tax competition  
  
  Serial tax competition may be highly relevant in the transport world in Europe 
and the US. Many interstate highways or railroads in the US, and the EU’s Trans 
European Networks potentially face this problem. Different countries may apply 
individual tolling instruments on their part of the network, with potentially substantial 
welfare losses as a result. Moreover, serial tax competition also arises with multi-
modal transfers in both passenger and freight transport when each mode is operated 
by a different authority.  
  Despite its importance, serial tax competition in transport has not been widely 
researched. In fact, the implications of tax competition for tax rates under different   12 
tolling regimes and the associated welfare effects have not been studied in detail at 
all. One important reference on serial horizontal tax competition in transport is 
Levinson (2001). He analyses US States’ choice of instruments for financing 
transportation infrastructure. Theory predicts, and an econometric analysis confirms, 
that jurisdictions are more likely to opt for toll-financing (instead of, e.g., fuel taxes) 
when the share of non-residential users is large. Obviously, tolls become more 
attractive because they allow price discrimination and tax-exporting. More recently, 
Verhoef and Rouwendal (2003) consider a simple network model that has a simple 
serial structure as a special case, and they look at the interrelation between pricing, 
capacity choice and financing of infrastructure. However, neither of the above models 
fully investigates optimal tax structures under tax competition, nor looks in details at 
their welfare effects.   
  Making abstraction of externality issues, the serial tax competition problem 
bears some analogies to the problem of vertical integration in the literature on 
industrial organisation (see, e.g., Tirole (1988)); these may be usefully exploited in 
future research. One can show that, when there is monopolistic behaviour both on the 
output market and on the market for intermediate inputs, every producer applies his 
optimal profit margin without realising that he decreases the profit base of the other 
producers in the supply chain. The result is ‘double marginalisation’: overall mark-
ups are higher but total profits lower than in the case with full vertical integration. As 
Tirole (1988) puts it : “What is worse than a monopoly? A chain of monopolies”. 
  When we transpose these ideas to a serial network, the potential for excessive 
overall taxation of inter-country or inter-modal trips is clear, at least to the extent that 
different authorities are involved in setting taxes on the different stretches of the serial 
network. To see the intuition, it is useful to hypothetically start from the extreme case 
with zero local transport. If there is only transit traffic, then individual countries or 
regional authorities will charge fees well in excess of the marginal external cost; 
overall trip tolls will be much larger than the welfare optimising sum of individual 
tolls. In welfare terms, serial toll competition may be drastically worse compared to a 
fully integrated serial network operated by one welfare maximising authority. When 
there is also local transport, the analogy is less straightforward but serial competition 
is not necessarily beneficial in welfare terms (De Borger, Proost and Van Dender, 
forthcoming 2004). 
   13 
 
4. Vertical tax competition 
 
  Again, we start by briefly reviewing the lessons from the public finance 
literature before moving on to the applicability in the transport sector. 
 
4.1. Lessons from public finance theory 
 
  Vertical tax competition (an indirect fiscal externality) between a higher and 
lower level of government may result if tax policies of one level of government affect 
tax revenues at another level due to, e.g., sharing of tax bases. The associated 
inefficiencies depend on whether governments are benevolent or not (welfare 
maximising or revenue maximising), on whether the game is Nash or Stackelbergh, 
and on the existence of limits on the available tax instruments. First, assume 
benevolent governments and suppose the federal government is interested in 
‘correcting’ vertical inefficiencies at lower levels (i.e., it is the leader in a 
Stackelbergh game; see, Boadway and Keen (1996) and Boadway et al (1998)). The 
typical argument then is that the lower level sets tax rates inefficiently high because it 
ignores the effect of its taxation on the tax revenues for the higher level government. 
One shows that the federal level can in principle undo any vertical inefficiency 
created by the lower level of government by combinations of taxes-subsidies and 
intergovernmental grants.  
  Second, if  benevolent federal and local governments move simultaneously 
(Nash game), Hoyt’s (2001) model with identical local governments implies that the 
federal level cannot affect tax policies of local governments, but through its own 
choice of tax rate on the overlapping tax base it can still induce the efficient overall 
tax rates. Grants are then used to obtain the appropriate mix of local and federal 
public services.  These results do not hold in a system of regions where each local 
authority chooses its own tax rate such as the EU.  In that case the higher level cannot 
restore efficiency by setting the federal tax rates, which are uniform across regions. 
Moreover, if the federal level cannot use grants, it will lower its tax rates to partially 
offset the fiscal externality and reduce federal public good provision. If in addition tax 
bases do not fully overlap in the sense that the federal level has additional   14 
instruments, it should actually subsidize some goods that are inefficiently taxed by 
lower level governments.  
  Third, if governments are not benevolent the results drastically change. For 
example, if governments maximise revenues instead of welfare (Keen and 
Kotsogiannis (2003)) a reduction of tax rates from the Nash equilibrium levels is 
welfare-improving and raises total tax revenues (i.e., bringing countries on the wrong 
side of the Laffer curve). 
 
4.2.Vertical tax competition in the transport economics literature  
 
  Despite its relevance for the transport sector, the insights of the public finance 
literature on vertical tax competition have hardly been translated or applied to 
transport taxation and pricing. That the issue is important is clear. Most transport 
flows are not only taxed or subsidised in various different ways, but typically the 
different taxes are set by different hierarchical levels of government. For example, 
people that both use their private car and public transport face payments of 
registration taxes on their cars, they pay fuel taxes, they pay public transport fares, 
they may face road tolls, etc. Some of the taxes may be set by higher level 
governments (e.g., in most countries fuel taxes are determined at the national level), 
but public transport fares and road tolls may be set by local authorities. Moreover, in 
some cases clear rules exist for the sharing of the revenues generated out of the 
various taxes.  
  The literature discussed in section 4.1 shows that this type of problem has 
been studied in the public finance literature, but it has not been applied systematically 
to transport pricing. In fact, theoretical and empirical optimal transport pricing models 
with higher and lower level governments that imply vertical tax externalities is 
extremely scarce. De Borger et al. (1998) and Proost and Sen (2003) contain very 
preliminary illustrative analyses of the problem. The former paper illustrates different 
pricing optima for a city government (Brussels) and a regional government within a 
country (Belgium) and considers simple forms of revenue-sharing, but it does not 
formally analyse the optimal policies that correct the vertical inefficiencies. The latter 
study first theoretically illustrates the optimal tax problem when a local and a national   15 
government are involved in a Stackelbergh game, and it empirically verifies some of 
the theoretical predictions. 
  In what follows we limit the discussion to, first, an intuitive explanation of the 
nature and the importance of the problem and, second, a brief review of a specific 
case study that helps to illustrate the potential implications of this type of competition.  
   
 
 
4.2.1. Identification of the problem 
 
  The vertical tax problem arises because different levels of government may be 
responsible for different transport policy instruments; this induces a number of 
complicated interactions because of overlap of tax bases, differences in objectives 
between governments, spill-overs of externalities, etc. As an example, suppose that in 
a given country the national level is responsible for a number of policy instruments 
such as setting fuel taxes, road pricing, etc. Within the country, however, city 
governments may be responsible for local congestion charges, local public transport 
prices, parking fees, etc. These instruments can be used to correct local congestion in 
the urban area. Moreover, note that each government is likely to have different 
objectives, and it probably takes different external costs into account. For example, 
the urban government may only care about externalities imposed on the local 
population, and its interpretation of ‘welfare’ may be largely limited to the concern 
for the urban population; only to a minor extent does it care about non-urban residents 
such as commuters. Table 4 summarizes the most relevant information on the 
characteristics of the overall problem just described. 
   16 
 
 
Table 4: Local and global optima with vertical interaction 
  City government  National government 
Externality  spillover  Cares about externalities 
imposed on city residents 
only; e.g. ignore time 
losses for commuters 
Cares about externalities 
imposed on all national 
residents; e.g. internalise 
commuting time losses  
Tax  exporting  Yes; export taxes to non-
residents 
No 
Overlapping tax bases: 
indirect vertical fiscal 
externality  
Partially Partially 
Differences in tax 
instruments 
Use of local congestion 
taxes, local public 
transport prices, parking 
fees 
Use of all instruments, 
including fuel taxes 
Tax revenue  Local  congestion  taxes, 
local public transport 
surplus or deficit, parking 
fees 
Fuel taxes, all congestion 
taxes, all non-local public 
transport net revenues 




  The above concrete problem setting allows us to easily identify at least four 
reasons why the tax structure and the level of taxation will be suboptimal:  
 
(i)  There are fiscal externalities associated with overlapping tax bases. An 
increase in federal fuel taxes reduces transport demand, including local 
transport, and therefore affects the local congestion toll revenues and public 
transport revenues for the city government. This is ignored by the national 
government in setting fuel taxes, yielding too high federal taxes. From the 
vieuwpoint of the city government, a federal fuel tax increase is treated as an 
increase in resource cost.  
(ii)  Tax exporting by the city government. This is due to the fact that the city 
government cares less about commuters than about city residents. The 
implication is that local congestion charges on commuters will be excessively 
high from an overall welfare viewpoint. 
(iii)  There are externality spillovers. The local authorities only care about 
externalities imposed on local residents; this induces them to set local taxes 
too low.   17 
(iv)  The use of imperfect and different instruments by different governments. The 
local government only controls a local congestion tax and local public 
transport prices to correct externalities.  
 
 
4.2.2. Some intuition based on a simple example 
 
  The interaction of all the above implications of vertical tax competition leads 
to results that are difficult to fully predict a priori. We therefore illustrate the 
consequences for tax levels and welfare using a simple numerical example described 
in Proost and Sen (2003). They consider the case where only two policy instruments 
are available: the only instrument under control of an urban government are local 
parking fees, and an (overlapping) regional government decides on a peak period 
cordon toll around the area to control congestion. The cordon toll is paid only by 
commuters, not by local city residents. The role of each government level is defined 
in table 5. 
  Note that the two levels of governments are supposed to receive the full 
revenues of the tax instruments they control. Moreover, we assume that the behaviour 
of each government level consists of maximising the welfare of the representative 
citizen in its constituency: the urban government maximises the welfare of its 
inhabitants only, whereas the regional government maximises the sum of the welfare 
of all citizens (i.e., its urban citizens and its commuters, where the weights correspond 
to their relative importance in the population). 
 
   18 
 
 
Table 5 Structure of the policy game 
 




Parking fee for all cars  Level of cordon toll  
(uniform over time) 
Share in parking revenues   100% of parking fee 
revenue (in excess of 
resource cost) is 
redistributed to urban 
citizens 
0 
Share in cordon toll 
revenues 
0  100% of cordon toll 
revenue is redistributed to 
commuters 
Welfare function   Welfare of representative 
urban citizen
4 
Welfare of representative 





  The main research questions are: first, how do parking fees and congestion 
charges differ between centralised and decentralised solutions? Second, what is the 
welfare loss we can expect from non coordinated policies? Third, what determines 
these welfare losses? To study these questions, three alternative equilibria for the 
policy game between the two governments are considered: (i) a centralised outcome 
where all decisions (parking fees, cordon charges) are taken by the regional 
government, (ii) the Nash equilibrium solution, and (iii) a Stackelberg equilibrium 
where it is assumed that the regional government announces its cordon pricing policy 
first. A Stackelberg equilibrium where the regional government is the leader is more 
credible than the reverse (in which the urban government would first announce its 
parking policy) because the regional government may very well need to announce a 
harmonised policy guideline for several urban areas at the same time. 
  The results are summarized in Table 6. First consider the centralized 
equilibrium. The best equilibrium one can achieve is an equilibrium with parking fees 
(expressed per passenger kilometer) of 0.246 and 0.101 for residents and commuters, 
respectively, and a cordon toll on commuters of 0.301. Parking fees increase above 
                                                 
4 The external costs (air pollution, noise, accidents)  borne by the urban government are proportional to 
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the resource costs because the cordon toll only affects the peak car demand of the 
commuters. This combination of optimal parking and cordon tolls achieves a welfare 
gain of 1.55% compared to the reference situation. 
Table 6 Performance of the different equilibria 
     Regional   optimal optimal 
% regional 
welfare 
     Welfare  parking cordon  toll  Gain 
         IN    OUT       
Centralised Solution  55.221 0.246 0.10  0.301 1.55
    
Nash Solution    55.13 0.27  0.11  0.29 1.38
                  
Stackelberg Solution  55.16 0.22  0.09  0.44 1.43
Ref. Eq.(reference Parking)        54.38   0
Note: IN - Insiders of urban area; OUT- Outsiders or commuters 
Deleted: ¶  20 
  To understand the non-cooperative outcomes (Nash-Stackelbergh) it is useful 
to realize that in our model setting one expects the urban government to try to tax 
commuters via high parking fees, because this revenue is redistributed to the urban 
citizens only. Parking fees therefore act as a potential tax exporting mechanism. On 
the other hand, however, the regional government is interested in relatively high 
cordon tolls to reduce congestion and to generate revenues. To understand the 
interactions, consider Figure 1; this depicts the reactions functions of the two 
governments. The flatter reaction function is the reaction function of the urban 
government that chooses its preferred parking fee for a given cordon toll. The steeper 
reaction function represents the optimal cordon toll chosen by the regional 
government for a given parking fee. The centralized solution is obviously a point on 
this latter reaction function, the Stackelbergh outcome is on the urban govenrment’s 
reaction function. The Nash equilibrium is obviously the intersection of the two 






































Figure 1: Reaction functions of urban and regional government 
 
 
  With these considerations in mind let us turn to the non-cooperative outcomes. 
It follows from Table 6 that the Nash outcome, compared to the centralized solution, 
has higher parking fees (0.27 for residents) and a lower cordon toll (0.29). 
Surprisingly, note that the degree of tax exporting through high parking charges on 
commuters is quite limited, mainly due to the regional government’s high cordon toll. 
Another striking result is that the welfare gain achieved by the non-coordinated 
solution is only some 10% lower than the fully coordinated solution. To some extent,   21 
this is due to the choice of instruments and the allocation of responsibilities. For 
example, the outcomes would have been quite different if the cordon toll was 
controlled by the urban government: this would lead to very high tolls on commuters 
and probably much larger inefficiencies. 
  Looking at the Stackelberg solution, note that the regional government takes 
into account the tendency of the urban government to charge too high parking fees 
and announces therefore a relatively high cordon toll (0.44 rather than 0.29). Given 
this high toll, the urban government limits its parking fees (0.22 rather than 0.27). 
Because the regional government has the same welfare function as the centralised 
solution we can achieve a better overall welfare level than in the Nash equilibrium. 
Compared to the centralised solution, one achieves a welfare level that is 7.75% 
lower. 
  Finally, the effects of different rules for sharing the revenues were considered. 
In the case reported in Table 6, it was assumed that the urban government did not 
receive any share in the cordon toll revenue. The consequence was an urban 
government that used the parking fee to extract revenue from commuters. One way to 
give a more balanced incentive for the urban government is to give it also a share in 
the cordon toll revenues. Allocating a fixed share (equal to half its share in total 
population- inhabitants plus commuters) of the cordon toll revenues to the urban 
government was found to lead to a Nash equilibrium that is more efficient. It yielded 
lower parking charges and a higher toll, and a loss compared to welfare in the 
centralised case of only 6.5% instead of 10%. Also the Stackelberg solution does 
better: it performs now only 3% less efficient than the centralised solution. In other 
words, sharing the revenues can lead to more efficient equilibria with higher overall 
welfare levels. The price to pay for this higher efficiency is a less equitable 
distribution of welfare as the commuters receive now an even smaller share of the tax 
revenue they pay. 
  Despite the extremely simple setting used for this example, there are some 
useful lessons to be learned. We offer three tentative conclusions: 
 
1.  Very often pricing instruments are chosen by different overlapping government 
levels. Even if they each maximise the welfare of all their voters, this generates 
inefficiencies because of overlapping tax bases and a tendency for tax exporting 
by the core urban area.   22 
2.  Non-cooperative equilibria do not necessarily perform very poorly in welfare 
terms as long as each government cares about externalities. In a sense, correcting 
externalities is more important than the side effects of tax competition. We found 
the Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium were only 5% to 10% less efficient than the 
fully coordinated centralised solution. 
3.  Changing the sharing rules for tax revenue can decrease the welfare loss of non-




5. Suggestions for further research 
 
 
  In this paper we surveyed the literature on horizontal and vertical tax 
competition in the transport sector. In this concluding section we indicate some 
important topics for future research.  
  Consider parallel horizontal tax competition. What are the main challenges? A 
first one is to focus on more detailed and realistic pricing instruments. The existing 
theoretical literature implicitly looks at kilometre charges, but the precise distinction 
between fuel taxes, road tolls, cordon pricing, etc. has not convincingly been made. 
Second, it is important to incorporate other instruments apart from pricing. 
Specifically, there is a need to introduce investment as a strategic instrument. Not 
only is capacity a strategic factor in tax revenue generation, but it also directly affects 
congestion. Given the difficulties in solving joint pricing–capacity problems, this 
extension may be difficult (see, e.g., Kraus (2003), Verhoef and Rouwendal (2003)), 
but the insights gained will be very useful. Third, introducing capacity also raises the 
issue of optimal instrument choice by a central (for example, at the EU level) 
government coordinating horizontal competition. Fourth, it seems desirable to 
carefully study under what condition there exist possibilities for welfare-improving 
tax competition. The public finance literature has produced a substantial literature on 
beneficial tax competition in a dynamic context (Kehoe (1989), Janeba (1998)). The 
question is whether such beneficial tax competition matters in a transport setting. As 
yet, no research along these lines has been produced. Finally, there is a need for more 
empirical studies on the welfare effects of tax competition using realistic and real 
world information on existing networks. Currently available studies by and large limit   23 
applied work to simple illustrative numerical examples. It remains to be seen whether 
the costs of non-cooperative behaviour are substantial or not. 
  As far as serial horizontal tax competition is concerned, it seems that this area 
is largely underdeveloped. First, given its importance in view of the EU’s Trans 
European Networks and intermodal transport flows, theoretical research on the 
implications of this type of competition is highly needed. Probably a lot can be learnt 
from double marginalisation results in vertical integration theory in industrial 
organisation, but specific transport characteristics may imply important additional 
features. Moreover, here as well, the possibilities for welfare-improving tax 
competition have to be addressed. Second, here as well there is a need to not just 
consider pricing instruments, but also incorporate investment. Governments will 
indeed use capacity as a strategic instrument in a serial setting. Third, optimal 
instrument choice by a coordinating central government is again relevant. Realistic 
applications with real data are needed to evaluate the welfare effects. 
  Concerning vertical tax competition, it is necessary to provide more 
theoretical insights on the results of vertical tax interaction with realistic pricing 
instruments (which government controls which instruments, optimal allocation of 
authority, etc.) and reasonable tax sharing rules. Moreover, the mechanisms available 
to correct inefficiencies, including various revenue sharing instruments, should be 
studied in detail. Again, numerical analysis using real world cases is highly desirable 
to appreciate the welfare effects of non-coordination.  
  Finally, more research on the political economy of using price and regulatory 
instruments is necessary. How do countries decide on their tax and toll instruments? 
Case study approaches (London, kilometre charges in Germany, etc.) may be useful 
here. Which instruments and levels are more likely to be observed? Why, despite 
substantial support from economists, are tolling instruments not frequently used? 
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